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Abstract
Discovering the stances of media outlets and
influential people on current, debatable topics
is important for social statisticians and policy
makers. Many supervised solutions exist for
determining viewpoints, but manually annotat-
ing training data is costly. In this paper, we
propose a cascaded method that uses unsuper-
vised learning to ascertain the stance of Twit-
ter users with respect to a polarizing topic by
leveraging their retweet behavior; then, it uses
supervised learning based on user labels to
characterize both the general political leaning
of online media and of popular Twitter users,
as well as their stance with respect to the tar-
get polarizing topic. We evaluate the model by
comparing its predictions to gold labels from
the Media Bias/Fact Check website, achieving
82.6% accuracy.
1 Introduction
Online media and popular Twitter users, which we
will collectively refer to as influencers, often ex-
press overt political leanings, which can be gleaned
from their positions on a variety of political and
cultural issues. Determining their leaning can be
done through the analysis of their writing, which in-
cludes the identification of terms that are indicative
of stance (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005; Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2011). Performing such analysis auto-
matically can be done using supervised classifica-
tion, which in turn would require manually labeled
data (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005; Gentzkow and
Shapiro, 2011; Mohammad et al., 2016). Alter-
natively, leanings can be inferred based on which
people share the content (blogs, tweets, posts, etc.)
on social media, as social media users are more
likely to share content that originates from sources
that generally agree with their positions (An et al.,
2012; Morgan et al., 2013; Ribeiro et al., 2018;
Wong et al., 2013).
Here, we make use of this observation to character-
ize influencers, based on the stances of the Twitter
users that share their content. Ascertaining the
stances of users, also known as stance detection,
involves identifying the position of a user with re-
spect to a topic, an entity, or a claim (Mohammad
et al., 2016). For example, on the topic of abortion
in USA, the stances of left- vs. right-leaning users
would typically be “pro-choice” vs. “pro-life”, re-
spectively.
In this paper, we propose to apply unsupervised
stance detection to automatically tag a large num-
ber of Twitter users with their positions on specific
topics (Darwish et al., 2020). The tagging identi-
fies clusters of vocal users based on the accounts
that they retweet. Although the method we use
may yield more than two clusters, we retain the
two largest ones, which typically include the over-
whelming majority of users, and we ignore the rest.
Then, we train a classifier that predicts which clus-
ter a user belongs to, in order to expand our clus-
ters. Once we have increased the number of users
in our sets, we determine which sources are most
strongly associated with each group based on shar-
ing by each group. We apply this methodology to
determine the positions of influencers and of media
on eight polarizing topics along with their overall
leaning: left, center or right. In doing so, we can
also observe the sharing behavior of right- and left-
leaning users, and we can correlate their behavior
with the credibility of the sources. Further, given
the user stances for these eight topics, we train a
supervised classifier to predict the overall bias of
sources using a variety of features, including the
so-called valence (Conover et al., 2011a), graph
embeddings, and contextual embeddings. Using
a combination of these features, our classifier is
able to predict the bias of sources with 82.6% accu-
racy, with valence being the most effective feature.
Figure 1 outlines our overall methodology.
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Figure 1: General outline of our methodology.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We use unsupervised stance detection to au-
tomatically determine the stance of Twitter
users with respect to several polarizing topics.
• We then use distant supervision based on these
discovered user stances to accurately charac-
terize the political leaning of media outlets
and of popular Twitter accounts. For classi-
fication, we use a combination of source va-
lence, graph embeddings, and contextualized
text embeddings.
• We evaluate our approach by comparing its
bias predictions for a number of news out-
lets against gold labels from Media Bias/Fact
Check. We further evaluate its predictions
for popular Twitter users against manual judg-
ments. The experimental results show sizable
improvements over using graph embeddings
or contextualized text embeddings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3
describes the process of data collection. Section 4
presents our method for user stance detection. Sec-
tion 5 describes how we characterize the influ-
encers. Section 6 discusses our experiments in
media bias prediction. Finally, Section 7 concludes
and points to possible directions for future work.
2 Related Work
Recent work that attempted to characterize the
stance and the ideological leaning of media and
Twitter users relied on the observation that users
tend to retweet content that is consistent with their
world view. This stems from selective exposure,
which is a cognitive bias that leads people to avoid
the cognitive overload from exposure to opposing
views as well as the cognitive dissonance in which
people are forced to reconcile between their views
and opposing views (Morgan et al., 2013).
Concerning media, Ribeiro et al. (2018) used the
Facebook advertising services to infer the ideologi-
cal leaning of online media based on the political
leaning of Facebook users who consumed them. An
et al. (2012) relied on follow relationships to online
media on Twitter to ascertain ideological leaning
of media and users based on the similarity between
them. Wong et al. (2013) studied retweet behavior
to infer the ideological leanings of online media
sources and popular Twitter accounts. Barbera´ and
Sood (2015) proposed a statistical model based
on the follower relationships to media sources and
Twitter personalities in order to estimate their ideo-
logical leaning.
As for individual users, much recent work fo-
cused on stance detection to determine a person’s
position on a topic including the deduction of politi-
cal preferences (Barbera´, 2015; Barber and Rivero,
2015; Borge-Holthoefer et al., 2015; Cohen and
Ruths, 2013; Colleoni et al., 2014; Conover et al.,
2011b; Fowler et al., 2011; Hasan and Ng, 2014;
Himelboim et al., 2013; Magdy et al., 2016a,b;
Makazhanov et al., 2014; Trabelsi and Zaı¨ane,
2018; Weber et al., 2013). User stance classifi-
cation is aided by the tendency of users to form
so-called “echo chambers”, where they engage
with like-minded users (Himelboim et al., 2013;
Magdy et al., 2016a), and the tendency of users’
beliefs to be persistent over time (Borge-Holthoefer
et al., 2015; Magdy et al., 2016a; Pennacchiotti and
Popescu, 2011b).
Studies have examined the effectiveness of differ-
ent features for stance detection, including textual
features such as word n-grams and hashtags, net-
work interactions such as retweeted accounts and
mentions, and profile information such as user loca-
tion (Borge-Holthoefer et al., 2015; Hasan and Ng,
2013; Magdy et al., 2016a,b; Weber et al., 2013).
Network interaction features were shown to yield
better results compared to using textual features
(Magdy et al., 2016a; Wong et al., 2013). Srid-
har et al. (2015) leveraged both user interactions
and textual information when modeling stance and
disagreement, using a probabilistic programming
system that allows models to be specified using a
declarative language.
Trabelsi and Zaı¨ane (2018) described an unsu-
pervised stance detection method that determines
the viewpoints of comments and of their authors.
It analyzes online forum discussion threads, and
therefore assumes a certain structure of the posts.
It also assumes that users tend to reply to each
others’ comments when they are in disagreement,
whereas we assume the opposite in this paper. Their
model leverages the posts’ contents, whereas we
only use the retweet behavior of users.
Many methods involving supervised learning
were proposed for stance detection. Such meth-
ods require the availability of an initial set of la-
beled users, and they use some of the aforemen-
tioned features for classification (Darwish et al.,
2018; Magdy et al., 2016b; Pennacchiotti and
Popescu, 2011a). Such classification can label
users with precision typically ranging between
70% and 90% (Rao et al., 2010; Pennacchiotti and
Popescu, 2011a). Label propagation is a semi-
supervised method that starts with a seed list of
labeled users and propagates the labels to other
users who are similar based on the accounts they
follow or retweet (Barbera´ and Sood, 2015; Borge-
Holthoefer et al., 2015; Weber et al., 2013). While
label propagation may label users with high preci-
sion (often above 95%), it is biased towards users
with more extreme views; moreover, careful choice
of thresholds is often required, and post-checks are
needed to ensure quality.
Abu-Jbara et al. (2013) and more recently Dar-
wish et al. (2020) used unsupervised stance de-
tection, where users are mapped into a lower di-
mensional space based on user-user similarity, and
then clustered to find core sets of users represent-
ing different stances. This was shown to be highly
effective with nearly perfect clustering accuracy
for polarizing topics, and it requires no manual
labeling of users. Here, we use the same idea,
but we combine it with supervised classification
based on retweets in order to increase the number
of labeled users (Darwish, 2018). Other methods
for user stance detection include collective clas-
sification (Duan et al., 2012), where users in a
network are jointly labeled and classification in a
low-dimensional user-space (Darwish et al., 2017).
As for predicting political leaning or sentiment,
this problem was studied previously as a super-
vised learning problem, where a classifier learns
from a set of manually labeled tweets (Pla and Hur-
tado, 2014; Bakliwal et al., 2013; Bermingham and
Smeaton, 2011). Similarly, Volkova et al. (2014)
predicted Twitter users’ political affiliation (being
Republican or Democratic), using their network
connections and textual information, relying on
user-level annotations.
3 Data Collection
We obtained data on eight topics that are consid-
ered polarizing in the USA (Darwish et al., 2020),
shown in Table 1.
They include a mix of long-standing issues such
as racism and gun control, temporal issues such as
the nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the US
Supreme Court and Representative Ilhan Omar’s
polarizing remarks, as well as non-political issues
such as the potential dangers of vaccines. Further,
though long-standing issues typically show right–
left polarization, stances towards Omar’s remarks
are not as clear, with divisions on the left as well.
Since we are interested in US users, we filtered
some tweets to retain such by users who have stated
that their location was USA. We used a gazetteer
that included words that indicate USA as a country
(e.g., America, US), as well as state names and
their abbreviations (e.g., Maryland, MD).
Other data that we used in our experiments is a
collection of articles that were cited by users from
the tweets collection and that originate from media,
whose bias is known, i.e., is discussed on the Media
Bias/Fact Check website.
4 User Stance Detection
In order to analyze the stance of influencers on
a given topic, we first find the stances of Twitter
users, and then we project them to the influencers
that the users cite. A central (initial) assumption
here is that if a user includes a link to some arti-
cle in their tweet, they are more likely to agree or
endorse the article’s message. Similarly, when a
user retweets a tweet verbatim without adding any
comments, they are more likely to agree with that
tweet. We label a large number of users with their
stance for each topic using a two-step approach,
namely projection and clustering and supervised
classification.
For the projection and clustering step, we iden-
tify clusters of core vocal users using the unsuper-
vised method described in (Darwish et al., 2020).
In this step, users are mapped to a lower dimen-
sional space based on their similarity, and then they
are clustered. After performing this unsupervised
learning step, we train a supervised classifier using
the two largest identified clusters in order to tag
many more users. For that, we use FastText, a deep
neural network text classifier, that has been shown
to be effective for various text classification tasks
(Joulin et al., 2017).
Topic Keywords Date Range No. of Tweets
Climate change #greendeal, #environment, #climate, #climatechange, #carbonfootprint, #climatehoax, #cli-
mategate, #globalwarming, #agw, #renewables
Feb 25–Mar 4, 2019 1,284,902
Gun control/rights #gun, #guns, #weapon, #2a, #gunviolence, #secondamendment, #shooting, #massshooting,
#gunrights, #GunReformNow, #GunControl, #NRA
Feb 25–Mar 3, 2019 1,782,384
Ilhan Omar remarks on
Israel lobby
IlhanOmarIsATrojanHorse, #IStandWithIlhan, #ilhan, #Antisemitism, #IlhanOmar, #IlhanMN,
#RemoveIlhanOmar, #ByeIlhan, #RashidaTlaib, #AIPAC, #EverydayIslamophobia, #Islamo-
phobia, #ilhan
Mar 1–9, 2019 2,556,871
Illegal immigration #border, #immigration, #immigrant, #borderwall, #migrant, #migrants, #illegal, #aliens Feb 25–Mar 4, 2019 2,341,316
Midterm midterm, election, elections Oct 25–27, 2018 520,614
Racism & police brutal-
ity
#blacklivesmatter, #bluelivesmatter, #KKK, #racism, #racist, #policebrutality, #excessiveforce,
#StandYourGround, #ThinBlueLine
Feb 25–Mar 3, 2019 2,564,784
Kavanaugh Nomination Kavanaugh, Ford, Supreme, judiciary, Blasey, Grassley, Hatch, Graham, Cornyn, Lee, Cruz,
Sasse, Flake, Crapo, Tillis, Kennedy, Feinstein, Leahy, Durbin, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Coons,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Booker, Harris
Sept. 28-30, 2018 &
Oct. 6-9, 2018
2,322,141
Vaccination benefits &
dangers
#antivax, #vaxxing, #BigPharma, #antivaxxers, #measlesoutbreak, #Antivacine, #Vac-
cinesWork, #vaccine, #vaccines, #Antivaccine, #vaccinestudy, #antivaxx, #provaxx, #Vaccines-
SaveLives, #ProVaccine, #VaxxWoke, #mykidmychoice
Mar 1–9, 2019 301,209
Table 1: Polarizing topics used in study.
Once we have expanded our sets of labeled users,
we identify influencers that are most closely asso-
ciated with each group using a modified version of
the so-called valence score, which varies in value
between −1 and 1. If an influencer is being cited
evenly between the groups, then it would be as-
signed a valence score close to zero. Conversely,
if one group disproportionately cites an influencer
compared to another group, then it would be as-
signed a score closer to −1 or 1. We perform these
steps for each of the given topics, and finally we
summarize the stances across all topics. Below, we
explain each of these steps in more detail.
4.1 Projection and Clustering
Given the tweets for each topic, we compute the
similarity between the top 1,000 most active users.
To compute similarity, we construct a vector for
each user containing the number of all the accounts
that a user has retweeted, and then we compute
the pairwise cosine similarity between them. For
example, if user A has only retweeted user B 3
times, user C 5 times and user E 8 times, then
user A’s vector would be (0, 3, 5, 0, 8, 0, 0, ... 0).
Solely using the retweeted accounts as features has
been shown to be effective for stance classification
(Darwish et al., 2020; Magdy et al., 2016a). Fi-
nally, we perform dimensionality reduction and we
project the users using Uniform Manifold Approxi-
mation and Projection (UMAP). When performing
dimensionality reduction, UMAP places users on
a two-dimensional plane such that similar users
are placed closer together and dissimilar users are
pushed further apart. Figure 2 shows the top users
for the “midterm” topic projected with UMAP onto
the 2D plane. After the projection, we use Mean
Shift to cluster the users as shown in Figure 2. This
is the best setup described in (Darwish et al., 2020).
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Figure 2: Top active users on the midterm topic clus-
tered using UMAP + Mean Shift.
Clustering high-dimensional data often yields sub-
optimal results, but can be improved by projecting
to a low-dimensional space (Darwish et al., 2020).
4.2 Supervised Classification
Since unsupervised stance detection is only able to
classify the most vocal users, which only constitute
a minority of the users, we wanted to assign stance
labels to as many additional users as we can. Given
the clusters of users that we obtain for each topic,
we retain the two largest clusters for each topic,
and we assign cluster labels to the users contained
therein. Next, we use all the automatically labeled
users for each topic to train a supervised classi-
fier using the accounts that each user retweeted
as features (same as the features we used to com-
pute user similarity earlier). For classification, we
train a FastText model using the default parameters,
and then we classify all other users with five or
more retweeted accounts, only accepting the classi-
fication if FastText was more than 80% confident
(70–90% yielded nearly identical results).
Topic No. of Users Clustered Classified
Users Users
climate change 724,470 860 5,851
gun control 973,206 813 11,281
Ilhan Omar 563,706 723 25,484
immigration 940,840 901 22,456
midterm elections 312,954 860 12,765
police brutality & racism 1,175,081 891 18,978
Kavanaugh 809,835 891 10,100
vaccine 194,245 545 556
Table 2: Users per topic: total number of users, umber
of clustered users, and number of automatically labeled
users.
In order to obtain a rough estimate of the ac-
curacy of the model, we trained FastText using
a random 80% subset of the clustered users for
each topic and we tested on the remaining 20%.
The accuracy was consistently above 95% for all
topics. This does not mean that this model can
predict the stance for all users that accurately —
the clustered users were selected to be the most
active ones. Rather, it shows that the classifier can
successfully capture what the previous, unsuper-
vised step has already learned. Table 2 lists the
total number of users who authored the tweets for
each topic, the number of users who were automat-
ically clustered using the aforementioned unsuper-
vised clustering technique, and the number of users
who were automatically labeled afterwards using
supervised classification. Given that we applied
unsupervised stance detection to the most active
1,000 users, the majority of the users appeared in
the largest two clusters (shown in Table 2).
4.3 Calculating Valence Scores
Given all the labeled users for each topic, we com-
puted a valence score for each influencer. As
mentioned earlier, the valence score ranges be-
tween [−1,1], where a value close to 1 implies
it is strongly associated with one group of users,
−1 shows it is strongly associated with the other
group of users, and 0 means that it is being shared
or cited by both groups. The original valence score
described by Conover et al. (2011a) is calculated
as follows:
V (u) = 2
t f (u,C0)
total(C0)
t f (u,C0)
total(C0)
+ t f (u,C1)total(C1)
−1 (1)
where t f (u,C0) is the number of times (term fre-
quency) item u is cited by group C0, and total(C0)
is the sum of the term frequencies of all items cited
by C0. t f (u,C1) and total(C1) are defined in a sim-
ilar fashion.
We use the above equation to compute valence
scores for the retweeted accounts, but we using
a modified version for calculating the score for
influencers (I):
V (I) = 2
t f (I,C0)
total(C0)
t f (I,C0)
total(C0)
+ t f (I,C1)total(C1)
−1 (2)
where
t f (I,Ci) = ∑a∈I⋂Ci [ln(Cnt(a,Ci))+1]
total(Ci) = ∑I t f (I,Ci)
In the latter equation, Cnt(a,Ci) is the number
of times article a was cited by users from cluster Ci.
In essence, we are replacing term frequencies with
the natural log of the term frequencies. We opted to
modify the equation in order to tackle the following
issue: if users from one of the clusters, say C1, cite
only one single article from some media source a
large number of times (e.g., 2,000 times), while
users from the other cluster (C0) cite 10 other arti-
cles from the same media 50 times each, then using
equation 1 would result in a valence score of −0.6.
We would then regard the given media as having
an opposing stance to the stance of users in C0. Al-
ternatively, using the natural log would lead to a
valence score close to 0.88. Thus, dampening term
frequencies using the natural log has the desired
effect of balancing between the number of articles
being cited by each group and the total number of
citations. We bin the valence scores between −1
and 1 into five equal size bands as follows:
Cat(V ) =

−−, if s ∈ [−1,−0.6)
−, if s ∈ [−0.6,−0.2)
0, if s ∈ [−0.2,0.2)
+, if s ∈ [0.2,0.6)
++, if s ∈ [0.6,1]
(3)
5 Characterizing the Influencers
We use valence to characterize the leaning of all
cited influencers for each of the topics. Table 3
shows the valence categories for the top-cited me-
dia sources across all topics. It also shows each
media’s factuality of reporting, i.e., trustworthiness,
and bias (ranging from far-left to far-right) as de-
termined by mediaBiasFactCheck.com. Since the
choice of which cluster should be C0 and which
would be C1 is arbitrary, we can multiply by −1
the valence scores for any topic and the meaning
of the results would stay the same.
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Figure 3: Valence category vs. bias: number of media.
We resorted to doing so for some topics in order
to align the extreme valence bands across all topics.
Given tweet samples from users in a given cluster
for a given topic, labeling that cluster manually was
straightforward with almost no ambiguity. Table 4
shows the most frequently cited media source for
each topic and for each valence band.
Of the 5,406 unique media sources that have
been cited in tweets across all topics, 806 have
known political bias from mediaBiasFactCheck.
com. Figure 3 shows the confusion matrix between
our valence categories and the goold labels from
mediaBiasFactCheck.com.
We notice that many of the media that have a
negative valence score (categories − and −−) are
classified on the right side of the political spec-
trum by mediaBiasFactCheck.com, while most
media with positive scores (categories + and ++)
are classified as slightly left-leaning. Although
there are almost no extreme-left cases, there is a
correlation between bias and our valence score.
mediaBiasFactCheck.com seems to rarely catego-
rize media sources as “extreme-left”. This could
be a reflection of reality or it might imply that
mediaBiasFactCheck.com has an inherent bias.
We also computed the valence scores for the
top-200 retweeted accounts, and we assigned each
account a valence category based on the score. In-
dependently, we asked a person who is well-versed
with US politics to label all the accounts as left, cen-
ter, or right. When labeling accounts, right-leaning
include those expressing support for Trump, the
Republican party, and gun rights, opposition to
abortion, and disdain for Democrats.
1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Figure 4: The top-200 retweeted accounts, projected on
a number line according to their average valence.
As for left-leaning accounts, they include those
attacking Trump and the Republicans, and ex-
pressing support for the Democratic party and
for Liberal social positions. If the retweeted ac-
count happens to be a media source, we used
mediaBiasFactCheck.com. Table 5 compares the
per-topic valence for each retweeted account along
with the average category and the true label.
It is noteworthy that all top-200 retweeted ac-
counts have extreme valence categories on average
across all topics. Their average valence scores, with
one exception, appear between −0.6 and −1.00 for
right, and between 0.6 and 1 for left (see Figure 4).
Of those manually and independently tagged ac-
counts, all that were tagged as left-leaning have
a strong positive valence score and all that were
tagged as right-leaning have a strong negative va-
lence score. Only two accounts were manually la-
beled as center, namely Reuters and CSPAN, which
is a US channel that broadcasts Federal Govern-
ment proceedings, and they had valence scores of
0.55 and 0.28, respectively. Though their absolute
values are lower than those of all other sources,
they are mapped to the + valence category.
Table 3 summarizes the valence scores for the
media across all topics. Table 4 lists the most cited
media sources for each topic and for each of the
five valence bands. The order of the bands from
top to bottom is: ++, +, 0, − and −−. The table
also includes the credibility and the political lean-
ing tags from mediaBiasFactCheck.com. The key
observations from the table as follows:
1. Most right-leaning media appear overwhelm-
ingly in the − and −− valence categories. Con-
versely, left-leaning media appear in all valence
categories, except for the −− category. This
implies that left-leaning users cite right-leaning
media sparingly. We looked at some instances
where right-leaning users cited left-leaning me-
dia, and we found that in many cases the cited
articles reinforced a right-leaning viewpoint. For
example, right-leaning users shared a video from
thehill.com, a left-center site, 2,398 times for the
police racism topic. The video defended Trump
against charges of racism by Lynne Patton, a long-
time African-American associate of Trump.
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thehill.com H L-C + 0 ++ + + + + ++ ++
theguardian.com H L-C ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
washingtonpost.com H L-C ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
breitbart.com VL Far R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
foxnews.com M R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
nytimes.com H L-C ++ + ++ + + + ++ ++ ++
cnn.com M L + + ++ + ++ + + ++ +
apple.news + 0 0 + 0 0 + + ++
dailycaller.com M R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
rawstory.com M L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
huffingtonpost.com H L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++
truepundit.com L −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
nbcnews.com H L-C + −− ++ + ++ + + ++ ++
westernjournal.com M R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
reuters.com VH C + + ++ ++ + + + + ++
washingtonexaminer.com H R −− −− −− −− −− 0 −− −−
thegatewaypundit.com VL Far R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
politico.com H L-C + + + + + ++ + + ++
npr.org VH L-C + 0 ++ ++ ++ 0 ++ ++ ++
townhall.com M R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
msn.com H L-C + + + + 0 ++ 0 ++ 0
nypost.com M R-C − −− 0 − − + −− −
vox.com H L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++
thedailybeast.com H L ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ + ++ ++
bbc.com H L-C + + + ++ ++ 0 + + ++
independent.co.uk H L-C ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++
ilovemyfreedom.org VL Far R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
thinkprogress.org M L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
dailywire.com M R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −− ++
pscp.tv − −− −− −− 0 −− 0 −
dailymail.co.uk VL R − − 0 − − − − −− −−
msnbc.com M L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++
dailykos.com M L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++
bloomberg.com H L-C + + ++ 0 ++ + 0 + ++
usatoday.com H L-C + + + 0 + ++ + 0 +
Table 3: Media valence categories for each topic with included average column. Plus (+) and minus (−) signify
left or right leaning, respectively. Factuality: Very High (VH), High (H), Mixed (M), Low (L), Very Low (VL).
Bias: Left (L), Left-Center (L-C), Center (C), Right-Center (R-C), Right (R), Far Right (Far R). Blank cells mean
that we did not have information.
2. Most right-leaning sources in the −− cate-
gory have mixed, low, or very low factuality. Con-
versely, most left-leaning sites appearing in the −
valence category have high or very high factuality.
Similarly for the vaccine topic, where high credi-
bility sources, such as fda.gov and nih.gov, are
frequently cited by anti-vaccine users, mostly to
support their beliefs.
3. The placements of sources in different cate-
gories are relatively stable across topics. For exam-
ple, washingtonPost.com and theguardian.com
exclusively appear in the ++ category, while
breitbart.com and foxnews.com consistently ap-
pear in the −− category.
6 Predicting Media Bias
Given the stances of users on the aforementioned
eight topics, we leverage this information to predict
media bias. Specifically, we describe in this section
how we make use of the valence scores, as well
as other features, namely graph and contextualized
text embeddings, to train supervised classifiers for
this purpose.
Valence Scores. We use valence scores in two
ways. First, we average the corresponding va-
lence across the different polarizing topics to ob-
tain an average valence score for a given target
news medium. This is an unsupervised method
for computing polarity. Second, we train a Logis-
tic Regression classifier that uses the calculated
valence scores as features and annotations from
mediaBiasFactCheck.com as gold target labels in
order to predict the general political leaning of a tar-
get news medium. We merged “left” and “extreme
left”, and similarly we merged “right” and “extreme
right”. We discarded media labeled as being “left-
center” and “right-center”. Each news medium was
represented by an 8-dimensional vector containing
the valence scores for the above topics. In the ex-
periments, we used the lbfgs solver and C = 0.1.
We used two measures to evaluate its performance,
namely accuracy and mean absolute error (MAE).
The latter is calculated by considering the different
classes as ordered and equally distant from each
other, i.e., if the model predicts right and the true
label is left, this amounts to an error equal to 2.
climate change gun control Ilhan Omar immigration
theguardian.com H L-C thehill.com H L-C washingtonpost.com H L-C theguardian.com H L-C
washingtonpost.com H L-C cnn.com M L theguardian.com H L-C washingtonpost.com H L-C
independent.co.uk H L-C nytimes.com H L-C mondoweiss.net H L cnn.com M L
wef.ch npr.org VH L-C thinkprogress.org M L huffingtonpost.com H L
vox.com H L washingtonpost.com H L-C haaretz.com H L-C npr.org VH L-C
nytimes.com H L-C politico.com H L-C nytimes.com H L-C thehill.com H L-C
bbc.com H L-C usatoday.com H L-C thehill.com H L-C nytimes.com H L-C
cnn.com M L msn.com H L-C politico.com H L-C reuters.com VH C
reuters.com VH C bbc.com H L-C cnn.com M L politico.com H L-C
bloomberg.com H L-C cnbc.com H L-C apple.news usatoday.com H L-C
thehill.com H L-C apple.news mediaite.com H L apple.news
apple.news sun-sentinel.com H R-C usatoday.com H L-C msn.com H L-C
npr.org VH L-C nypost.com M R-C yahoo.com M L-C pscp.tv
seattletimes.com H L-C dailymail.co.uk VL R timesofisrael.com H L-C whitehouse.gov M R
newsweek.com M L mailchi.mp theatlantic.com H L-C texastribune.org H C
change.org H L washingtontimes.com H R-C nypost.com M R-C dailymail.co.uk VL R
latimes.com H L-C breaking911.com VL jpost.com H C nypost.com M R-C
dailymail.co.uk VL R chicagotribune.com H R-C dailymail.co.uk VL R zerohedge.com M
climatechangedispatch.com rt.com M R-C algemeiner.com H R-C ir.shareaholic.com
cnbc.com H L-C forbes.com M R-C startribune.com H L-C breaking911.com VL
forbes.com M R-C breitbart.com VL Far R foxnews.com M R breitbart.com VL Far R
breitbart.com VL Far R foxnews.com M R breitbart.com VL Far R illegalaliencrimereport.com
dailycaller.com M R ammoland.com H R townhall.com M R washingtonexaminer.com H R
tambonthongchai.com dailycaller.com M R change.org H L foxnews.com M R
wattsupwiththat.com L bearingarms.com M R hannity.com westernjournal.com M R
midterm police & racism Kavanaugh vaccine
washingtonpost.com H L-C washingtonpost.com H L-C thehill.com H L-C thehill.com H L-C
theguardian.com H L-C rawstory.com M L washingtonpost.com H L-C theguardian.com H L-C
rawstory.com M L huffingtonpost.com H L cnn.com M L washingtonpost.com H L-C
tacticalinvestor.com theguardian.com H L-C nytimes.com H L-C vaxopedia.org
vox.com H L nytimes.com H L-C huffingtonpost.com H L nytimes.com H L-C
thehill.com H L-C thehill.com H L-C politico.com H L-C cnn.com M L
reuters.com VH C apple.news apple.news statnews.com H C
nytimes.com H L-C cnn.com M L yahoo.com M L-C latimes.com H L-C
cnn.com M L nbcnews.com H L-C apnews.com VH C cbc.ca H L-C
dailykos.com M L thedailybeast.com H L latimes.com H L-C usatoday.com H L-C
apple.news msn.com H L-C usatoday.com H L-C cdc.gov VH
sagagist.com.ng pscp.tv mediaite.com H L medium.com M L-C
bbc.com H L-C bloomberg.com H L-C theweek.com H L-C newsroom.fb.com
alzwaaj.com politics.theonion.com lawandcrime.com help.senate.gov
washingtonexaminer.com H R rollcall.com VH C cnbc.com H L-C msn.com H L-C
dailymail.co.uk VL R mediaite.com H L pscp.tv change.org H L
pbs.org H L-C dailymail.co.uk VL R nypost.com M R-C fda.gov
zerohedge.com M news.sky.com H L-C ir.shareaholic.com variety.com
ajc.com H L-C newsone.com H L-C rollcall.com VH C
veritablenouvelordre.forumcanada.org aol.com H L-C c-span.org VH C
breitbart.com VL Far R breitbart.com VL Far R foxnews.com M R ncbi.nlm.nih.gov VH
foxnews.com M R defensemaven.io truepundit.com L vaccineimpact.com
dailycaller.com M R foxnews.com M R dailycaller.com M R naturalnews.com M
ilovemyfreedom.org VL Far R thegatewaypundit.com VL Far R breitbart.com VL Far R vaccines.me
westernjournal.com M R nypost.com M R-C thegatewaypundit.com VL Far R thevaccinereaction.org
Table 4: Top 5 websites per valence category for each topic.
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realdonaldtrump R −− 0 −− −− −− −− −− −−
charliekirk11 R −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
kylegriffin1 L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
dbongino R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
kamalaharris L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
mitchellvii R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
realsaavedra R −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
krassenstein L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
realjack R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
nbcnews L ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
education4libs R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
nra R −− −− −− −− −−
donaldjtrumpjr R −− −− −− −− −− −−
shannonrwatts L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
thehill L ++ ++ ++ + ++ + + ++ ++
realjameswoods R −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
gopchairwoman R −− −− −− −− −−
jackposobiec R −− −− −− −− −− −− −− −−
funder L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
cnn L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 0 ++ ++ ++
ajplus L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 0 ++
rashidatlaib L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ +
stevescalise R −− −− −− −−
jordan sather ? −− −− −− −− −− −−
aoc L ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Table 5: User valence categories for each topic, preceded by an average column, and a ground truth label. When a
cell is blank, there is insufficient data for that particular topic.
No Valence With Valence
Acc MAE Acc MAE
Baseline 1 (majority class) 43.3 .856 43.3 .856
Baseline 2 (average valence) – – 68.0 .330
Valence scores – – 75.2 .278
BERT (article title) 60.6 .539 78.3 .264
BERT (article content) 61.1 .526 79.2 .255
BERT (title+content) 62.2 .510 80.8 .228
BERT(Tweet) 64.0 .485 73.6 .302
GraphEmbM 63.5 .468 69.1 .380
GraphEmbH 66.9 .425 71.8 .347
GraphEmbM+H 68.0 .400 79.0 .251
GraphEmbM+H+BERT (tweet) 72.5 .358 80.5 .230
GraphEmbM+H+BERT (tweet, content) 76.1 .311 81.2 .221
GraphM+H+BERT (tweet, title, content) 78.1 .284 82.6 .206
Table 6: Predicting media bias.
The results are shown in Table 6, where we can
see that using the average valence score yields
68.0% accuracy (0.330 MAE) compared to 75.2%
accuracy (0.278 MAE) when using the eight indi-
vidual valence scores as features.
Graph embeddings. We further use graph em-
beddings, generated by building a User-to-Hashtag
graph (U2H) and a User-to-Mention (U2M) graph
and then running node2vec on both (Atanasov et al.,
2019), producing two types of graph embeddings.
When using graph embeddings, we got worse re-
sults compared to our previous setup with valence
scores (see Table 6). However, when we combine
them with the valence scores, we observe a sizable
boost in performance, up to 11% absolute.
Tweets. We also experimented with BERT-base.
We used the text of the tweets that cite the me-
dia we are classifying. For classification, we fed
BERT representations of tweets to a dense layer
with softmax output to fine-tune it with the textual
contents of the tweets. We trained at the tweet level,
and we averaged the scores (from softmax) for all
tweets from the same news medium to obtain an
overall label for that news medium. The accuracy
is much lower than for the valence scores: 64.0%
accuracy vs. 75.2% for supervised and 68.0% for
unsupervised.
Article titles and text. Using the BERT setup
for Tweets, we used the titles and the full text of
up to 100 articles from each of the target media.
When using the full text of articles, we balanced the
number of articles per news medium. We trained
two separate BERT models, one on the titles and
another one on the full text (content). Both models
did worse than using valence alone, but the combi-
nation improved over valence only.
System Combination. We combined different
setups including using all the aforementioned mod-
els in combination. Using graph embeddings
(GraphH + GraphM) with BERT embeddings
(Tweet+Title+Content) and valence yielded the
best results with accuracy of 82.6% and MAE of
.206. If we remove valence from the combination,
the accuracy drops by 4.5% while MAE jumps by
.078, absolute. This suggests that valence is a very
effective feature that captures important informa-
tion, complementary to what can be modeled using
graph and contextualized text embeddings.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a method for predicting the gen-
eral political leaning of media sources and popular
Twitter users, as well as their stances on specific
polarizing topics. Our method uses retweeted ac-
counts, and a combination of dimensionality reduc-
tion and clustering algorithms, namely UMAP and
Mean Shift, in order to produce sets of users that
have opposing opinions on specific topics. Next,
we expand the discovered sets using supervised
learning that is trained on the automatically discov-
ered user clusters. We are able to automatically
tag large sets of users according to their stance of
preset topics. Users’ stances are then projected to
the influencers that are being cited in the tweets for
each of the topics using the so-called valence score.
The projection allows us to tag a large number of
influencers with their stances on specific issues and
with their political leaning in general (i.e., left vs.
right) with high accuracy and with minimal human
effort. The main advantage of our method is that it
does not require manual labeling of entity stances,
which requires both topical expertise and time. We
also investigated the quality of the valence features,
and we found that valence scores help to predict
media bias with high accuracy.
In future work, we plan to increase the number
of topics that we use to characterize media. Ideally,
we would like to automatically identify such polar-
izing topics. Doing so would enable us to easily
retarget this work to new countries and languages.
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